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Quantum theory is a fundamental part of contemporary science. But some recent arguments 
have been taken to show that if this theory is universally applicable then the outcome of a 
quantum measurement is not an objective fact. They motivate the more general reappraisal of 
the notions of fact and objectivity that I offer here. I argue that if quantum theory is 
universally applicable the facts about the physical world include a fact about each quantum 
measurement outcome. The physical facts may lack an ideal kind of objectivity but their more 
modest objectivity is all that science needs. 
 
1. Introduction 
Scientific procedures are designed to secure objectivity in part by minimizing the effects of 
individual differences in the ways scientists select, collect and report the data used to assess 
their theories. As the word suggests, at some level the data are supposed to be something 
anyone can recognize as simply objective facts―there for anyone to observe. Measurement 
outcomes provide data for a physical theory. Unless they are objective they support no 
objective scientific knowledge. So the outcome of a quantum measurement must be an 
objective physical fact. But recent arguments1 have been taken to show that if quantum theory 
is universally applicable then the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an objective fact. 
They motivate the more general reappraisal of the notions of fact and objectivity that I offer 
here. If quantum theory is universally applicable the facts about the physical world include a 
fact about each quantum measurement outcome. They may lack an ideal kind of objectivity 
but their more modest objectivity is all that science needs. 
 Section 2 explains the conclusion of one argument based on Leegwater=s ([2018]) 
analysis of a Gedankenexperiment.2 I sketch the argument itself in an Appendix. It shows 
how the assumption that quantum theory is universally applicable leads to the conclusion that 
not every quantum measurement in this scenario can have a unique objective outcome. 
 Some may doubt the argument’s conclusion because they believe quantum theory does 
not apply universally.3 Others may doubt it because they believe quantum theory applies only 
                                                 
1 Including those in (Bong et al. [2020]; Brukner [2017], [2018], [2020]; Cavalcanti [2020]; Frauchiger and 
Renner [2018]; Healey [2018]; Leegwater [2018]). 
2 I chose this because it may be stated compactly and requires fewer questionable assumptions. 
3 I take the universal applicability of quantum theory to rule out discontinuous physical change in a quantum 
state, either on measurement or spontaneously as in so-called ‘collapse’ theories (Ghirardi and Bassi [2020]). 
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in some preferred frame.4  Everettians may readily accept the conclusion because they already 
assume multiple contrary outcomes, each observable in a different world. But they have 
something to learn about objectivity from the structure of ‘worlds’ in the scenario in which 
the argument is set and from the more general discussion in sections 3−6. 
 The argument impacts a collection of views on how to understand quantum theory that 
deny that a quantum state is what Bell ([2004]) called a beable—an element of physical 
reality, according to a theory in which it figures. Instead of describing or representing the 
physical condition or behaviour of a system, these views take a quantum state simply to yield 
Born probability measures over alternative possible events in which it may be involved 
(including measurements). That is roughly what Schrödinger ([1935]), QBists (Fuchs, 
Mermin and Schack [2014]), neo-Copenhagenists (Brukner [2017]) and pragmatists (Healey 
[2017a]), along with many other physicists (including Bohr?) take to be the constitutive 
function of the quantum state. Some readers may not realize how wide is the consensus on 
this view of quantum states since much recent philosophical discussion of quantum theory 
has focused on Everettian, Bohmian and physical ‘collapse’ interpretations/theories which 
take a quantum state to have a more than merely epistemic or prescriptive function.5 
 Consensus on this constitutive function soon dissolves into disagreement. Arguments 
mentioned in note 1 have prompted some (QBists) to emphasize the subjectivity of 
measurement outcomes, while others have concluded that they are relative rather than 
absolute. Here I focus instead on the consequences for objectivity and defend scientific 
objectivity against relativist and subjectivist threats. 
 Since experiments to date have placed no limits on the universal applicability of 
quantum theory Wheeler’s ‘radical conservatism’ counsels us to assume there are none. In 
various Gedankenexperimenten extending that of Wigner’s ([1961]) friend this implies that 
not all quantum measurements can have unique outcomes. This is a paradoxical conclusion in 
what I’ll call the consensus view that the constitutive function of a quantum state is to yield 
probabilities for just such unique outcomes. 
 Section 3 considers attempts to resolve the paradox by appeal to the contextuality of 
sentences purporting to state facts about unique measurement outcomes. Appeals to 
contextuality of use fail to do so, but if the content of a sentence depends on the context at 
which it is assessed then the paradox may be avoided. Section 4 raises and answers the 
question as to how these sentences are assessable for truth or falsity only at an appropriate 
context. A sentence used in one context is assessable at another only insofar as quantum 
theory can be applied at both contexts at once in a wider context. 
 Section 5 applies and extends Huw Price=s ([1988], [2003]) work on the notions of 
fact and truth to say why these notions may be limited in application by physical limits to 
communication while continuing to serve the functions that explain why we have them. I 
conclude by applying the lessons of the paradox to the world as it is―a world in which 
realizing the paradoxical scenario will forever remain beyond the powers of any agents. In the 
consensus view of our quantum world there are no transcendently objective facts about the 
outcomes of quantum measurements―nor indeed about the values of electric currents, nor 
even about the position of the apparatus in the laboratory. But these are immanently objective 
                                                 
4 In Bohmian mechanics a universal wave-function evolves continuously in the preferred frame in which particle 
positions are taken to be distributed in accordance with the Born rule. 
5 For work by philosophers who take this consensus view seriously, see (Dascal [2020]; Dieks [2019a,b]; Evans 




facts―facts expressed by sentences used to express truths when assessed at all actual 
contexts. Such facts provide all the objective data we need as scientists or those who rely on 
the objectivity of the knowledge they support. 
 
2. Analyzing the Paradox 
A set of plausible assumptions cannot all be taken to be true when applied in the scenario of 
the following Gedankenexperiment. A GHZ quantum state of three spin-½ particles is 
prepared. Alice, Bob and Charlie are in isolated labs when each measures the z-spin of a 
different particle at the same t-time in their common inertial frame. After each as has 
recorded their outcome at t1, Eugene, Daniel, and Johnny (who are also in separately isolated 
labs stationary in that frame) each then measure a similar X-observable at the same t-time, 
recording their outcomes at t2: Eugene measures XA on Alice’s lab (including her particle, 
recording equipment and body), Johnny measures XB on Bob’s lab, and Daniel measures XC 
on Charlie’s lab; they record their outcomes at t2. Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s measurements 
are pairwise spacelike separated; and so are Eugene’s, Daniel’s, and Johnny’s. Though 
(absolutely) later than Alice’s measurement, Eugene’s measurement is also spacelike 
separated from Bob’s and from Charlie’s; Johnny’s later measurement is spacelike separated 
from Alice’s and from Charlie’s; and Daniel’s later measurement is spacelike separated from 
Alice’s and from Bob’s. 
 For this GHZ state6, the Born rule yields joint probabilities for the outcomes of each 
triple of spacelike separated measurements. Let a, b, c number whether the z-spin of an atom 
was recorded as up (+1) or down (−1) by Alice, Bob, Charlie respectively; and let u, v, w 
number whether the relevant X observable on Alice’s, Bob’s, Charlie’s lab was recorded as 
+1 or as −1 by Eugene, Johnny, Daniel respectively. The Born rule here implies that (with 
probability 1): 













   (1) 
But the Born rule also implies (with probability 1) that 
    u.v.w. = −1   (2) 
Since the Born probability of any individual outcome other than ±1 is zero, each of a, b, c 
must (probability 1) be either +1 or −1. Multiplying equations (1) together gives u.v.w. = +1, 
in contradiction to (2). 
 This paradoxical conclusion follows from two broad assumptions: that there is a fact 
about the outcome of every (competent) quantum measurement and that quantum theory is 
universally applicable. But the content of each assumption requires clarification. 
 I’ll take quantum theory to be universally applicable only if the evolution of an 
isolated system’s quantum state is always unitary, with no physical ‘collapses’ or ‘jumps’,7, 8 
where this requirement holds in any special relativistic inertial frame when quantum theory is 
applied in Minkowski spacetime. 
 A system remains isolated while not interacting with any other system: any interaction 
                                                 
6  If necessary after Lorentz-transforming this state to the relevant inertial frame. 
7 This is the Schrödinger picture state. 
8 That quantum theory is universally applicable in this respect is consistent with the results of experiments 
performed to date looking for violations of unitarity associated with so-called ‘collapse’ theories including those 
of (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [1986]; Penrose [2014]).  
 
 4 
would be marked by an interaction term in the Hamiltonian when quantum theory is applied 
to a supersystem containing that system. Isolation need involve neither spatial distancing nor 
sealing-off with barriers. 
  Unitary evolution of the quantum state is assumed to hold even for isolated 
laboratories including conscious experimenters and any system on which they perform a 
quantum measurement and record the outcome. And it is assumed to hold despite such an 
experimenter’s reassignment of the quantum state of the system measured in her laboratory to 
reflect the measurement’s outcome. 
 The Born rule is assumed to apply to each individual and joint measurement involved 
in the scenario of the Gedankenexperiment, and to yield the correct probabilities—here, as 
elsewhere. 
 With these clarifications, the assumption that quantum theory is universally applicable 
may be summarized as follows: 
 
 Universality of Quantum Theory: Unitary quantum theory with the Born rule applies 
 to every isolated system in any frame, including to the contents of an isolated 
 laboratory in which a quantum measurement is performed. 
 
 The second assumption leading to paradox is that there is a fact about the outcome of 
every quantum measurement. Now every experimenter knows that some measurements fail to 
yield an outcome because something goes wrong: perhaps the detector is inefficient, the 
apparatus is disturbed, or the power goes out. This assumption needs to abstract from such 
real-life messiness without circular appeal to a quantum measurement’s success. This may be 
done by modeling a quantum measurement as an interaction between a target system and an 
apparatus. I’ll assume that all measurements in the paradoxical scenario are ideal Von 
Neumann measurements involving interactions that perfectly correlate initial eigenstates of 
the measured observable with final eigenstates of the corresponding apparatus system while 
leaving the initial system eigenstate unchanged. Consistent with the universal applicability of 
quantum theory, this permits a formulation of the assumption that there is a fact about the 
unique outcome of a quantum measurement (so modeled) with no appearance of circularity. 
 Applied to an initial superposed system state, an ideal Von Neumann measurement 
yields a final superposed quantum state not associated with the apparatus system’s ‘pointer’ 
indicating any particular value of the measured magnitude. That is how the quantum 
measurement problem arises here. But no inconsistency arises on the consensus view that a 
quantum state does not represent the physical condition of systems to which it is assigned. 
The final (superposed) quantum state of target system and apparatus has no such 
representational role in the consensus view of section 1. Understood this way, a quantum state 
is associated not with values of magnitudes of the system, but with the possible values 
magnitudes of this or other systems may acquire as a result of a suitable interaction, 
importantly including measurement interactions. 
 The second assumption may now be stated as: 
 
  Single Outcomes: Any quantum measurement has only one single outcome. 
 
 If quantum theory is universally applicable then it may be applied in the scenario of 
the Gedankenexperiment in which all six measurements there described are modeled as ideal 
von Neumann measurements. The second assumption implies that there is a fact about the 
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outcome of the measurement by each of Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eugene, Johnny and Daniel. 
 The following sentences concern the outcome of Alice’s measurement: 
(A) The outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin up. 
(A)ʹ The outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin down. 
(A) is true if the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin up but false if the 
outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin down, in which case (A)ʹ is true. 
There is fact about the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement if and only if exactly one of 
(A), (A)ʹ is true. I understand the occurrence of the word ‘is’ in (A) and (A)ʹ as tenseless: the 
sentence itself specifies the time of the outcome in Σ. The outcome may be ideally localized 
to a spacetime point assigned a time in any relevant frame. Just after that time Alice or one of 
her lab assistants may have used either (A) or (A)ʹ to state a fact about the unique outcome of 
the measurement. I follow Leegwater ([2018]) in assuming this is a fact only if the truth of 
that statement is not relative to an inertial frame. The outcome is recorded in the physical 
condition of a variety of objects in Alice’s laboratory (where the pointer points, what is stored 
on her computer’s hard drive, what is written in her notebook, and so on). While the 
description of a piece of recording equipment may be frame-relative, in each frame this 
condition serves to record the same outcome. 
 (A) and (A)ʹ have obvious analogs in sentences (B), (B)ʹ; (C), (C)ʹ that Bob, Charlie 
respectively may use in his laboratory to state and characterize the fact that his z-spin 
measurement has an outcome. Eugene can use one of (U) or (U)ʹ to state and characterize the 
fact that his XA-measurement had an outcome: 
 (U) The outcome of Eugene’s XA-measurement at t2 is +1. 
 (U)ʹ The outcome of Eugene’s XA-measurement at t2 is −1. 
(V), (V)ʹ; (W), (W)ʹ are analogous sentences for Johnny, Daniel respectively. 
 The assumption that there is a fact about the outcome of each of these six quantum 
measurements then implies that exactly one of the 64 sentences of the form 
(S) A*& B*&C*&U*&V*&W* 
may be used to truly state the outcomes of all six measurements. (An instance of schema (S) 
results from replacing A* either by (A) or by (A)ʹ and making analogous independent 
replacements of all the other starred letters). Moreover, this is a fact only if the truth of that 
statement is not relative to inertial frame. Here each conjunct of an instance of (S) is 
understood to be asserted in the laboratory where, and just after, the relevant outcome 
occurred. 
 A paradox arises here because applications of the Born rule imply that there is zero 
probability that any of the 64 sentences of the form (S) is true, and probability one that each is 
false. But there is a fact about the outcome of each of these six measurements only if exactly 
one of these 64 sentences is true. What kind of paradox is this? 
 A logical paradox occurs when a set of independently plausible assumptions implies a 
contradiction. We have arrived such a situation here only if the occurrence of a probability 
zero event in a finite event space implies a contradiction. The occurrence of such an event is 
often said to be impossible. But a contradiction arises only if we add the further assumption 
that a probability zero event does not occur, at least in this case. Is the occurrence of an event 
here consistent with its having probability zero? 
 This would be inconsistent if probability were a quasi-logical concept, as some 
(including Keynes ([1921])) have taken it to be. If probability is viewed as a kind of graded 
implication relation between premises and conclusion then probability one would correspond 
to logical implication, and probability zero to logical inconsistency. And if probability were a 
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kind of graded disposition—a propensity—then a probability of one or zero would correspond 
to a sure-fire disposition, implying the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. But neither 
of these views of probability seems adequate to the case of Born probabilities, and neither is 
adopted by most proponents of the consensus view of section 1. 
 Such views take probability assignments to have an epistemic or normative rather than 
a logical or metaphysical function. Some take a Born probability as a measure of an agent’s 
actual coherent degree of belief, while others hold it up as a normative standard to which the 
degrees of belief of any agent who accepts quantum theory should conform. This distinction 
does not matter for present purposes, since they all take the paradox arising from the scenario 
of the Gedankenexperiment to be epistemic. Anyone who accepts the Born probabilities of 
that scenario should be certain that every sentence of the form (S) is false, while if she 
believes that there is a fact about the unique outcome of every quantum measurement then she 
should also be certain that exactly one such sentence is true. 
 
3. Semantic Contextuality9 
Suppose a sentence like (A) used to state the outcome of a quantum measurement were 
semantically contextual because what statement it expresses varies with its context of use. 
Then it may express a true statement when used in Alice’s laboratory just after her 
measurement but a false statement when used in other contexts. Assume the same holds for 
each of the other eleven similar sentences that may be used to state the outcome of a quantum 
measurement in the scenario of the Gedankenexperiment. The paradox might then be resolved 
if, for each conjunct of a sentence of the form (S), there is a context in which the statement 
expressed by using a sentence of that form is true, while in no context can their conjunction 
be used to make a true statement. 
 (A) is not explicitly semantically contextual because it contains no indexicals such as 
‘I’, ‘now’ or ‘here’. Is it nevertheless use-contextual because its content depends implicitly on 
the context in which it is used? To resolve the paradox by appeal to such implicit use-
contextuality one would have to parametrize contexts of use so that (A) may express a truth 
when used in Alice’s lab just after her measurement but a false statement when used in some 
other relevant context. Contexts of use have been parametrized by Kaplan ([1989]) and others 
as (t, s, p, w), where t indicates the time and s the place of use by person p in world w. 
Variation in none of these parameters generates a context of use in which (A) makes a false 
statement, if (A) expresses a true statement when used in Alice’s lab just after her 
measurement. Variation in w is irrelevant because the paradox is set in a single world w, 
assumed to be possible consistent with the universal applicability of quantum theory. Alice’s 
lab assistant states the same truth as Alice when using (A) in the same circumstances, so 
variation in p would not yield a false statement. Like all the other 11 sentences describing the 
outcome of a quantum measurement in this scenario, (A) itself specifies both the laboratory in 
which that outcome occurs and the time when it occurs. There is no reason to suppose that 
any of these sentences expresses a statement with a different truth-value when used at 
different times or places. In the absence of any further relevant parameters marking a context 
of use, appeal to the use-contextuality of sentences like (A) fails to resolve the paradox. 
                                                 
9 Semantic contextuality arises whenever the truth-value of a sentence is sensitive to the circumstances in which 
it may be used or assessed. The term ‘contextual’ has a different sense in quantum foundations to refer to a 
theory in which the outcome of measuring an observable may depend on what other compatible observables are 
measured along with it. This section goes some to way toward connecting these apparently unrelated senses. 
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 To resolve the paradox we need to appeal to a further kind of context which 
(following MacFarlane ([2014])) I call a context of assessment. MacFarlane’s motive for 
introducing contexts of assessment is very different from mine. He uses them as part of a 
semantic proposal for a natural language like English that would make room for truth-
relativism—the possibility that a sentence used to make a statement with fixed content may 
be correctly assessed as true at one context but false at another. No friend of scientific truth-
relativism, I’ll use contexts of assessment first to resolve the paradox and then to explore the 
consequent limits of scientific objectivity. The key idea will be that a statement assessed as 
true at one context cannot be assessed either as true or as false at some other context. 
 I’ll take a context of assessment to involve a spacetime region such as the regions in 
which measurements occur in the paradoxical scenario. I call this context of assessment the 
‘environment’ of such measurements. It will take some time to say just what kind of 
environment this is. But notice already that this context of assessment requires no 
specification of any person pʹ (such as Alice) or world wʹ other than that in which 
measurements are made, actually or in a Gedankenexperiment. 
 At least in the paradoxical scenario, every application of quantum theory is to a 
system or systems in a particular environment. As is now recognized by a range of views on 
how the theory is best understood, any legitimate application of quantum theory’s 
probabilistic algorithm requires that a system’s quantum state should be robustly decohered 
through a process in which the system interacts with other systems in its environment. I’ll say 
that a ‘quantum event’ occurs when a system’s magnitude takes on a value in its environment. 
A necessary condition for the occurrence of a quantum event involving a system is that there 
be a process in the system’s environment that can be modeled by the robust decoherence of 
states in a system’s ‘pointer basis’, each associated with a different value of that magnitude. 
This is not a sufficient condition. In the consensus view, quantum theory itself cannot explain 
the event in which the magnitude takes on one rather than another value. But quantum events 
are observed to occur, and application of the Born rule correctly predicts the probability for a 
magnitude to take on one value rather than another when one does. 
  An interaction suitable to function as a quantum measurement may (and often does) 
have an outcome in an environment outside any laboratory with no agent present. All that is 
required is for a quantum model of the interaction to imply robust decoherence of system 
states in some pointer basis. In a measurement, a quantum event occurs as a corresponding 
magnitude takes on a value. The outcome o of a quantum measurement is typically marked by 
the occurrence of many separate such quantum events in different systems, but we can count 
their fusion also as the single composite quantum event o that occurs in the spacetime region 
they collectively occupy. 
 An ‘M-decoherence environment E’ of a quantum event e in which magnitude M takes 
on a value in a system is a region of spacetime RE that includes the region where e occurs, 
together with physical processes in RE that can be modeled by robust decoherence of that 
system’s states in a ‘pointer basis’ associated with different values of M. Such decoherence is 
robust in the sense that once a process starts the system’s reduced state remains very nearly 
diagonal in the pointer basis throughout RE. I’ll call these the ‘M-decoherence processes’ of 
the system in environment E. A ‘decoherence environment’ is an M-decoherence environment 
for some magnitude and system. A decoherence environment F ‘compatibly extends’ a 
decoherence environment E if and only if (for each M) all the M-decoherence processes of 
systems in E are also M-decoherence processes of systems in F (so E compatibly extends 
itself). Two decoherence environments are ‘distinct’ just in case no process occurs in both 
 
 8 
their regions, and ‘mutually isolated’ if and only if they are distinct and there is no interaction 
between any process in E and any process in F. A decoherence environment is ‘isolated’ if 
and only if it is mutually isolated from all distinct decoherence environments. Note that 
decoherence environments E, F may be mutually isolated if RE∩RF≠∅, or even if RE=RF. 
 A ‘context of assessment’ for each of the twelve sentences purporting to state the 
unique outcome o of a quantum measurement in the paradoxical scenario of section 2 is a 
decoherence environment E. E is a decoherence environment for which o occurs in RE if and 
only if E is an M-decoherence environment for every magnitude M that takes on a value in a 
quantum event that is part of o. The interior of Alice’s laboratory throughout her z-spin 
measurement occupies the region RA of the ‘primary’ context of assessment EA for a sentence 
(A): (A) is assessed as true at EA if Alice’s outcome is spin up, but false if it is spin down. 
Each of the other eleven sentences that figure in the paradoxical scenario may be assessed at 
its own primary context of assessment. 
 Since RA, RB are spacelike separated there can be no interaction between a process in 
RA and a process in RB: so EA, EB are mutually isolated. But there is a wider context of 
assessment EAB in region RA∪RB that is a compatible extension both of EA and of EB. Since z-
spin measurements in RA, RB are compatible, the Born rule may be applied to joint z-spin 
measurements in RA∪RB, so each of (A), (B) may be assessed as true or as false at EAB. 
Analogously, RC is spacelike separated from RA, RB, so there is a context of assessment EABC 
in RA∪RB∪RC that compatibly extends EAB and EC at which (A), (B), (C) may each be 
assessed for truth-value. 
 Eugene’s measurement also occurs at spacelike separation from those of Bob and 
Charlie, and there is a context of assessment EUBC for (U), (B), (C) that compatibly extends all 
of EU, EB, EC.  But there is no context of assessment at which each of (A), (B), (C), (U) may 
be assessed for truth-value, because EA, EB, EC, EU have no common compatible extension. 
This is because no decoherence environment EAU compatibly extends both M-decoherence 
environment EA for a magnitude M that takes on a value in region of spacetime RA to record 
Alice’s outcome and N-decoherence environment EU for a magnitude N that takes on a value 
in a region of spacetime RU to record Eugene’s outcome. Decoherence in a region of 
spacetime RA∪RU including both Alice’s and Eugene’s outcomes may privilege an M basis of 
‘pointer states’ or it may privilege an N basis. But because the observable that Alice measures 
is incompatible with the observable that Eugene measures there is no common basis of 
pointer states that can serve to record both their outcomes at once. Essentially, Eugene’s 
measurement removes all traces of Alice’s measurement outcome; Johnny’s measurement 
similarly erases Bob’s, and Daniel’s erases Charlie’s. 
 In the paradoxical scenario there are five contexts of assessment EABC , EABW , EAVC , 
EUBC , EUVW , each of which compatibly extends the primary context of assessment for three 
of the measurements in that scenario. But there is no compatible extension of more than three 
of these primary contexts. It follows that no sentence of the form (S) can be assessed as true 
or as false at any context of assessment that compatibly extends the primary context of 
assessment for each of its conjuncts.  
 An experimenter in each laboratory does assess the corresponding conjunct for truth 
or falsity by recording the outcome of the measurement in that laboratory. For example, there 
is a fact about the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement if and only if (A) or (A)ʹ is true but 
not both: and Alice assesses the truth-value of (A) at context EA. Leegwater ([unpublished]) 
required a unique outcome of a quantum measurement to be independent of perspective. This 
can now be understood to require that Alice’s measurement has a unique outcome only if (A) 
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has the same truth-value not only in the perspective provided by context EA but also in the 
perspectives provided by its compatible extensions EABC , EABW , EAVC: that (B) has the same 
truth-value at all analogous compatible extensions of context EB while (C) has the same truth-
value at all analogous compatible extensions of EC: that (U) has the same truth-value at EU as 
at EUBC and at EUVW , while (V), (W) each has the same truth-value at its primary context of 
assessment as at its analogous compatible extensions. But the paradox shows that it is 
irrational to believe these conditions can all be satisfied at once. 
 
4. Limits on Assessment 
If unitary quantum theory is universally applicable, then there is no perspective-independent 
fact about the outcomes of the six measurements performed in the paradoxical scenario. This 
is true even if compatible extensions of each outcome’s primary context of assessment offer 
the only available perspectives. But there are contexts of assessment such as EU for a sentence 
like (A) that do not compatibly extend its primary context of assessment. Should (A) not 
receive the same truth-value at EU as at EA? Why should contexts of assessment be restricted 
to decoherence environments: does a region of spacetime in which no decoherence processes 
occur not also offer a perspective on the outcome of Alice’s measurement? We need to 
understand how there can be limits to the assessment of sentences such as (A) and how this 
places limits on scientific objectivity. 
 Thomas Nagel's ([1986]) famous metaphor of the view from nowhere suggests an 
ideal of objectivity according to which a thought or statement expresses an objective truth if 
and only if its truth depends only on how things are in the world and has nothing to do with 
any contexts at which it might be assessed as true or as false. Any statement that meets this 
ideal may be called ‘transcendently objective’. The paradox shows that a sentence like (A) 
about the outcome of a quantum measurement cannot be used to make a transcendently 
objective statement about the world—to state what Brukner ([2018]) called a fact of the 
world. It shows that there can be no transcendently objective facts about the outcomes of 
these quantum measurements. It shows that there are not even perspective-invariant facts 
about these outcomes, where a fact is perspective-invariant if and only if it may be expressed 
by a statement that is true when assessed from every perspective. 
 Facts about the outcomes of quantum measurements in the paradoxical scenario are 
perspectival—what they are depends on the context of assessment because a statement 
assessed as true at one context cannot be assessed either as true or as false at others. I caution 
against calling these ‘relative facts’, because to do so falsely suggests that a statement about 
the outcome of a quantum measurement may be assessed as true at one context but as false at 
another. Quantum theory involves no such truth-relativism. It is factuality, not truth-value, 
which is perspectival in the paradoxical scenario. The problem is to understand how this is 
possible. This is a problem because commonly held preconceptions apparently rule out any 
notion of a perspectival fact. Reflection on another case that presents limits to assessment 
may help to loosen their hold on the imagination. 
 Consider the sentence (H): It is five o’clock here. (H) is use-contextual: ‘here’ marks a 
spatial index and the present tense marks an implicit temporal index. Once these are fixed by 
specifying the time and place of use, (H) may seem assessable as true or false (in the actual 
world) independent of context. But, as Wittgenstein ([1953], §350) recognized, a use of (H) 
on the sun has no readily assessable meaning or truth-condition on earth. The sun is in no 
terrestrial time-zone, terrestrial clocks cannot exist on the sun, and assessment of (H) at a 
terrestrial time and place presupposes a non-relativistic notion of absolute simultaneity. 
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Whether (H) is assessable at a terrestrial time and location is contingent on the availability of 
a physics capable of jointly modeling the sun and earth within a unified (spatiotemporal) 
framework. Both Newtonian and relativistic physical theories provide such a framework, 
though relativity leaves some latitude in how to model distant simultaneity. Our physics 
provides a theoretical framework that may be used to render (H) assessable here and now on 
earth. 
 But what physics provides it can also take away. Although we have reason to believe 
it does not represent the structure of our actual universe, Gödel’s ([1949]) model of general 
relativity illustrates this possibility. In this model there are closed timelike curves: indeed, any 
two points of the spacetime lie on such curve, so each event occurs both before and after itself 
in the curve’s time ordering. With no cosmic time in the Gödel universe it is impossible to 
introduce a corresponding notion of distant simultaneity, however arbitrary. The truth-value 
of (H) as used at some point in the Gödel universe cannot be assessed at any other point. The 
sentence (H) could not be used to state a transcendently objective or even perspective-
invariant fact in the Gödel universe. 
 Quantum theory now has an unbroken record of successful applications for close to a 
century. It has been successfully applied in the realm of the very large and the very small, 
over a huge range of energies, and to both simple and increasingly complex systems. It is 
appropriate to let our intuitions be guided by these successful applications when considering 
the limits on the assessment of sentences that may be used to state their results, including the 
outcomes of quantum measurements. 
 Applications of the Born rule are restricted to so-called compatible properties of a 
system—properties that quantum theory associates with non-commuting projection operators. 
A variety of no-go results rule out any extension to an assignment of joint probabilities to 
incompatible properties. If we are to be guided by our best physical theories, we should 
conclude that sentences ascribing incompatible properties to a system cannot be assessed 
together as true or as false. This is a significant restriction on contexts of assessment. It is met 
by sentences used to assert the outcome of a quantum measurement jointly observing a set of 
properties, since such properties are observable together only if they are compatible. 
  Contexts of assessment need not be confined to occasions on which these properties 
are actually observed in a quantum measurement: outcomes of quantum measurements are 
not observer-dependent. Sentences about properties of magnitudes may also be jointly 
assessed even though no experimenter performs a quantum measurement.10 They may be 
jointly assessed at any M-decoherence environment in which distinct M-values uniquely 
correspond to possession of contrary properties. But since no application of quantum theory 
requires or permits joint assessment outside of such an M-decoherence environment we 
should be guided by the theory in refusing to countenance any other contexts of assessment 
for sentences ascribing properties to quantum systems. 
 
5. Facts and the Limits of Truth 
Even if section 4 showed how there can be limits to the assessment of statements for truth and 
                                                 
10 So we should freely accept the obligation mentioned by Bell ([2004], p. 216) ‘If the theory is to apply to 
anything but highly idealized laboratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less “measurement-
like” processes are going on more or less all the time, more or less everywhere?’ But his follow-up question ‘Do 
we not have jumping then all the time?’ should be answered ‘No’, assuming these processes may be modeled by 




falsity, it did not say why there should be such limits. To understand why we need to look 
more closely at the notion of truth. 
 Facts and truth are two sides of a coin. When Alice utters (A) after measuring her 
particle’s z-spin she thereby takes herself to make a true statement. It is hard to think of 
clearer examples of statements of fact than scientists’ reports of the results of their own 
observations (which does not mean every such sincere report is true—science builds on 
fallible foundations). To break out of the tight circle connecting truth and fact it is tempting to 
seek an analysis, of one notion or the other. But for a pragmatist there is a prior question: 
What is the point of these notions? Why do we have them? What good are they, and why can't 
we do without them?  
 In his book Price ([1988]) argues against the analytic approach to the concept of a 
statement of fact in the first part while offering an explanation of why we have the notion of 
truth in the second. The explanation helps one to understand not only why the notion of truth 
is important in many domains of thought but also why there are limits to its applicability. It 
thereby helps one to appreciate the limits of the notion of a fact in general (and of an 
objective fact in particular). Section 4 gave conditions under which certain statements could 
be assessed for truth or falsity. Given the function of the notion of truth, there is no point in 
applying the notion unless those conditions are met. This explains why these statements 
should be assessed for truth or falsity only under those conditions. 
 In a deflationary view, the notion of truth has only a kind of book-keeping function. 
Rather than repeating a formula like ‘Tarski said/believed that snow is white, and snow is 
white’ for each of Tarski’s indefinitely many statements/beliefs, the truth predicate permits 
the simple generalization ‘Everything Tarski said/believed is true’.11 But while endorsing the 
deflationary idea that truth is not a substantial property, Price ([1988]) takes the notion of 
truth also to play a more socially significant normative role. By acknowledging truth as a 
norm of discourse, members of a speech community are motivated to engage in the kind of 
reasoned argument among members whose mental states initially differ that tends to align 
their mental states to the benefit of all. Such benefits accrue for mental states with what Price 
calls the Same Boat Property (SBP): 
 
 A class of mental states have the SBP if their typical behavioural consequences are such that their 
 behavioural appropriateness, or utility, is predominantly similar across a speech community. If a mental 
 state has the SBP, then if it is appropriate for any one  of us, it is appropriate for all―we are all in the 
 same boat.  (Price [1988], p. 152) 
 
 To probe the limits of a useful notion of truth in the paradoxical scenario we need to 
generalize the SBP so that it concerns the intentional states of a wider collection of agents 
than those composing a single human speech community. Here is a formulation of a 
Generalized Same Boat Property (GSBP)12: 
                                                 
11 Since it follows from this deflationary view that (A) is true if and only if the outcome of Alice’s z-spin 
measurement at t1 is spin up, endorsing that equivalence does not commit one to any more inflated 
correspondence theory of truth: nor does acknowledging that the notion of truth has an additional social 
normative function.  
12 The GSBP offers neither a notion of truth nor an explanation of why truth is a useful notion. It simply 
characterizes a class of intentional states in Dennett’s ([1989]) sense. These include many human mental states 
but perhaps also intentional states of cognitively sophisticated non-human social agents, conscious or otherwise. 
Public expression of a belief-like intentional state in this class amounts to a statement. Subjecting such 
statements to the norm of truth will tend to benefit at least the group. 
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 A class of intentional states have the GSBP if their typical behavioural consequences 
 are such that their behavioural appropriateness, or utility, is predominantly similar 
 across a collection of social agents. If an intentional state has the GSBP, then if it is 
 appropriate for any agent in the collection, it is appropriate for all―they are all in the 
 same boat. 
A collection of social agents may be partitioned into mutually isolated groups where by 
expressing its own intentional states a member of one group is able to affect those of other 
members of its group, but unable to affect those of members of other groups. As long as these 
groups remain mutually isolated, expression of intentional states by members of one group 
cannot effectively align the intentional states of all agents in the collection. The norm of truth 
can fulfill its social function within each group, but not across the lines separating groups. 
 There may be fundamental physical barriers to communication. Even if there are 
societies of intentional agents over our cosmic event horizon we will never be able to affect 
each other’s intentional states. There can be no communication between scientists in different 
isolated laboratories in the scenario of section 2. In each case we have a collection of agents 
segmented into physically and therefore socially isolated communities. So we might expect 
difficulties in applying a universal notion of truth to their statements, and corresponding 
limitations on the notion of a fact. But there is an important difference between the cases. 
 Current general relativistic models of the large scale structure of the universe give 
sense to assessment here and now of sentences about when an event occurred over our cosmic 
horizon, by incorporating a global cosmic time that crosses the horizon and thereby 
establishes a theoretical connection between events on opposite sides. Locating these events 
within a single theoretical model makes it significant and sometimes possible to assign a 
truth-value to other sentences also. Our best theories tell us that the cosmic microwave 
background radiation over our cosmic event horizon closely approximates the same spectrum 
of black body radiation, that space-time still has a metric satisfying Einstein's field equations, 
that there are galaxies of stars, and so on. Our justified confidence in our best theories dictates 
belief that there are non-perspectival facts about events over our cosmic event horizon just as 
it dictates belief in the existence of that horizon. 
 Contrast this with the paradoxical scenario of section 2. Here our best theory 
(quantum theory) connects contexts of assessment only if the theory may be applied in a 
compatible extension of all those contexts. For example, (A) may be assessed at EB and (B) at 
EA only because EAB compatibly extends each of EA, EB. After Eugene’s measurement there is 
no context at which any agent can assess both (A) and (B). Alice and Bob can never share the 
outcomes of their experiments. Immediately after performing their experiments these are at 
spacelike separation: later they are effectively erased by Eugene’s and Johnny’s 
measurements. But this does not prevent the application of quantum theory at EAB that 
requires joint assessment of (A), (B) at that context even though no single experimenter can 
verify both outcomes. Alice’s verification of the truth-value of (A) at EA thereby verifies it 
also at EAB: but neither Alice, Bob nor anyone else can verify a truth-value assignment to both 
(A) and (B) at EAB, even though the applicability of quantum theory requires their joint 
assessability at that context. 
 In a standard experiment verifying or exploiting violations of Bell inequalities, the 
outcomes of measurements at different locations can be shared later because their 
decoherence environments do not remain isolated but fuse into a single subsequent 
decoherence environment. In that fused environment many experimenters can verify the 
outcomes of all these measurements. We have confidence in the application of quantum 
 
 13 
theory to spatially separated measurements on entangled systems only because very many 
such verifications on a wide variety of systems assigned entangled quantum states have 
yielded statistics confirming joint probabilities predicted by the Born rule.  
 The features of the paradoxical scenario that distinguish it from a standard experiment 
manifesting non-classical patterns of correlation would also make it extraordinarily difficult 
to realize in an actual experiment. Preparing the entangled GHZ state would be difficult, but 
not beyond present technical capabilities. While each individual measurement by Alice, Bob 
or Charlie would not be hard to realize, it would be a challenge to ensure that measurements 
of any pair occur at spacelike separation. But there are two reasons why the paradoxical 
Gedankenexperiment is so far beyond the bounds of practicality that neither we nor any other 
community of agents will ever be able to perform it. 
 The first reason is that it is and seems likely always to remain far beyond our technical 
capabilities to perform any of the individual measurements by Eugene, Johnny and Daniel. It 
is easy formally to write down a unitary transformation that would model the interaction 
Eugene (for example) would have to apply to measure XA on Alice’s laboratory together with 
the spin ½ atom she has measured. But the operations needed to implement this interaction 
would need to be applied not just to the large scale features of Alice's lab but precisely and in 
a very specific way at the level of all its microscopic constituents, including the atoms and 
ions composing the bodies of its occupants. It is hard to imagine how any agent could ever 
perform these operations. If performed, they would effectively remove any record of Alice’s 
outcome: if Eugene were to observe her lab immediately after he would be equally likely to 
find multiple concordant apparent records of a spin up outcome or of a spin down outcome, 
whatever Alice had actually found. A recent paper (Aaronson, Atia and Susskind, 
[unpublished]) shows that this is a generic feature of measurements sensitive to such 
macroscopic superpositions. 
 The more fundamental reason why the scenario of section 2 will remain only a 
thought-experiment has to do with the assumption of physical isolation. The scenario 
assumed that a system could be isolated from the decohering effect of its external 
environment, in which case its environment corresponds to its own internal decoherence. But 
decoherence spreads extraordinarily widely extremely fast. Even in interstellar space a lab 
could not be isolated from the decohering influence of its external environment, including 
starlight, the all-pervasive 2.7 degree Kelvin microwave background radiation and even 
gravitational waves. 
 This second reason has implications for the objectivity of measurement outcomes. The 
practical impossibility of confining decoherence within any lab implies that experimenters are 
in practice always in the same boat: their intentional states concerning outcomes of their 
respective quantum measurements have the GSBP no matter how hard they may try to isolate 
their separate labs. Insofar as it is only physically localized agents that can perform quantum 
measurements, it is not just we humans that are inevitably always in the same boat: so would 
be any aliens or androids that may perform quantum measurements and acquire intentional 
states noting their outcomes. We all share a single decoherence environment and so we can 
reasonably expect to be able to reach agreement on the outcomes of any quantum 
measurements that can ever actually be performed. A notion of truth suitable for any actual 
community is universal enough, and yields all the objectivity we need as scientists and can 
hope for as people. 
 
6. Scientific Objectivity Reassessed and Reasserted 
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The scenario of section 2 exhibits limits to truth and factuality, and thereby threatens the 
objectivity of science: there can be no transcendently objective facts about the outcomes of 
those quantum measurements. But since realizing that scenario is so far beyond our abilities it 
is not obvious what this implies about the kind of objectivity that matters for science. To 
address this question consider why its realization is so far beyond our abilities. 
  No system or laboratory can be completely isolated from the effects of environmental 
interactions associated with decoherence of its quantum state. It is decoherence of the right 
sort that makes quantum measurements possible. But even very weak and ineliminable 
interactions between a laboratory and its external environment would combine with the 
interaction needed to measure an X-magnitude involving that laboratory so as to effectively 
decohere its state in a model and thereby destroy a delicate correlation like u.v.w. = −1 that 
led to the paradox. To put it metaphorically, the paradoxical scenario will forever remain 
merely a thought-experiment because realizing it would require an impossible combination of 
the absence of decoherence external to each laboratory with the presence of just the right kind 
of decoherence within that laboratory. This is not just an impossible combination for human 
scientists to create: it is beyond the powers of any system complex enough to constitute an 
agent capable of noting the outcome of a quantum measurement as a subsystem of a 
laboratory system. So no alien, android, or quantum computer running an advanced AI 
program could play the role of an observer in realizing the paradoxical scenario. 
 In the view from nowhere, the measurements of Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eugene, Johnny 
and Daniel could not all have had unique outcomes. But transcendent objectivity is a 
metaphysical ideal, not a presupposition of successful science. Although its content may be 
diminished, a claim about the outcome of a single or joint measurement by the agents in the 
Gedankenexperiment is still objective in several senses. First, statements about measurement 
outcomes are not subjective: they are not about, and not relative to, the epistemic state or 
consciousness of the one who makes them. Secondly, any agent who has accepted quantum 
theory can adopt the perspective of any of Alice, Bob or their friends in the thought-
experiment and understand, use and (hypothetically) assess the truth-value of statements 
about the outcome of a measurement from that perspective. Third, and most importantly, 
there are no completely isolated labs, and even if there were there is no conceivable practical 
way of performing the interactions needed to implement an X-measurement on such a lab and 
its contents. In all practically realizable situations scientists and all other agents now, and 
always will, share a single perspective because they inhabit a single environmental context. 
 This third sense is worth a name of its own. I’ll call a statement ‘immanently 
objective’ if it expresses a truth at all actual contexts of assessment. The measurement 
outcomes in the paradoxical scenario would not be even immanently objective: Alice's 
statement of her outcome would be evaluated as true at her environment but not at Eugene's, 
for example. But the thought-experiment cannot be performed because quantum decoherence 
is pervasive in the only environment actually shared by all agents. This provides the only 
actual context of assessment for statements about the outcomes of quantum measurements. So 
these are all immanently objective―objective enough to provide data that supports quantum 
theory. 
 So far I have focused on the objectivity of measurement outcomes. But what I have 
said applies much more widely. Most if not all statements about the physical world may be 
recast as statements about the values of magnitudes. These include statements about settings 
of switches and knobs on experimental equipment and currents in coils, but also statements 
about the behavior of a mouse, the height of a plant, the structure of an FMRI image, and 
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even where things are in and outside the lab. One can adopt the consensus view of quantum 
theory while taking such statements to be just as objective as science needs them to be, even 
though no statement about the value of a magnitude is transcendently objective: and since we 
share a single decoherence environment with all agents it is not just human science whose 
objectivity is not threatened by the paradox. The conceptual distinction between transcendent 
and immanent objectivity has no conceivable practical scientific significance, though it is of 
great philosophical interest. 
 
Appendix 
Here I sketch the argument whose conclusion is explained in section 2. The scenario unfolds 
in a Gedankenexperiment involving a triple of spin 2 atoms initially assigned an entangled 
GHZ state. Measurements are made not only on these systems but also on entire isolated 
laboratories in which those measurements are made on them. Since Wigner ([1961]) is 
credited with first publicizing the possibility of performing a quantum measurement on an 
entire isolated laboratory containing his friend13, this may be called a scenario where 
Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger meet Wigner=s friend―the title of a preprint by Leegwater 
([unpublished]) whom I credit with this argument. 
 
A.1. The scenario of Wigner=s friend 
Wigner ([1961]) considered a Gedankenexperiment in which his friend (whom I’ll call Alice) 
is confined to a physically isolated laboratory while performing a quantum measurement on a 
system (I=ll take this to be of the z-spin of a spin 2 atom initially assigned a spin-up quantum 
state of x-spin). Applying the Born rule of quantum theory to this state, Alice should expect a 
unique outcome of either z-spin up or z-spin down, each with probability 2. Eugene initially 
remains outside the laboratory without interacting with it. Assuming that quantum theory is 
applicable to any isolated system no matter how large or complex14, Wigner (and his 
namesake Eugene) assigns a quantum state to the entire contents of Alice=s laboratory 
(including her body as well as the atom and all her measuring and recording apparatus). He 
further assumes that this state evolves unitarily during Alice=s measurement since her 
laboratory then remains isolated. After Alice=s measurement this state will therefore be an 
entangled superposition, one component of which is often thought to correspond to Alice=s 
outcome up (as observed by Alice and multiply recorded in her laboratory) while the other 
corresponds to Alice=s outcome down (as similarly observed by Alice). 
The tension between the assumption that unitary quantum theory is universally 
applicable and the assumption that every quantum measurement has a unique outcome is 
already apparent. But it may be relieved in this case by blocking the inference from the 
superposed state to absence of a unique outcome. Despite assigning a superposed state to her 
laboratory, Eugene can consistently maintain that Alice=s measurement had a unique outcome 
before breaking the isolation by opening the door to have a look for himself. Insisting on a 
unique outcome even with such a superposed state is not an ad hoc move on what I called the 
consensus view of the function of a quantum state. On this view the scenario of Wigner=s 
friend yields no paradox. 
 
                                                 
13 A referee kindly noted that Everett discussed essentially the same scenario in his later published 1956 thesis. 




A.2. The scenario of Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 
One consequence of Bell=s theorem ([1964], [2004]) is that the probabilistic predictions of 
any local hidden variable theory are inconsistent with those of quantum theory in certain 
circumstances. The quantum predictions have now been thoroughly verified in a wide range 
of these circumstances. Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger ([1990]) extended Bell=s theorem to 
a situation involving only extremal (0 or 1) probabilistic predictions. They considered an 
entangled state of three quantum systems now known as a GHZ state. To explain their 
argument I’ll consider a scenario involving a GHZ state of three spin 2 atoms (see equation 
(13) of Leegwater ([unpublished])).  
The Born rule predicts that this state has a number of interesting properties: 
(1) If the y-spin of each atom is measured simultaneously the outcome will (with probability 
1) be either all spin up or all spin down, and each outcome is equally likely (probability 2). 
(2) If the x-spin of each atom is measured simultaneously there are four possible (non-zero 
probability) outcomes; but in each case if we assign +1 to a spin up outcome and −1 to a spin 
down outcome then the product of these three numbers will (with probability one) be −1. 
(3) If the x-spin of one atom is measured simultaneously with measurements of the z-spins of 
the other two there are four possible (non-zero probability) outcomes; and if up/down 
outcomes are assigned +1/−1 as in (2), then the product of these three numbers will (with 
probability one) be +1. 
Suppose that a measurement of a component of spin merely reveals whether that 
component had spin up or down when it was measured. Then we can assign numbers to these 
properties just as we assigned numbers to the outcomes of a corresponding spin measurement. 
Let a, b, c number whether the x-spin of the first, second, third atom was up or down; and let 
u, v, w number whether the z-spin of the corresponding atom was up or down. Then (2) 















Multiplying these last three equations together it follows that a.b.c = +1, in contradiction to 
what (2) implied. So, with probability one, the Born probabilities predicted by the GHZ state 
are incompatible with the assumption that each measurement merely revealed the value of the 
measured spin-component. Experiments have verified the Born probabilities for similar GHZ 
states (Pan et al. [2000]). 
 
A.3. Wigner’s friend meets GHZ 
Though striking, neither of the scenarios described so far is paradoxical. Each may be 
rendered compatible with the assumptions that unitary quantum theory is universally 
applicable and that every quantum measurement has a unique outcome. We arrive at a 
paradox only by suitably combining these scenarios into a third, more complex scenario. 
 The idea is to substitute the assumed outcomes of actual quantum measurements for 
the hidden states assumed in the GHZ scenario. These will be quantum measurements on 
three spin ½ atoms assigned a GHZ state, and they will be performed in three mutually 
isolated laboratories. Each laboratory will be assumed also to be isolated from everything else 
except during the performance of a measurement on that laboratory. This last measurement 
will be analogous to a measurement Eugene might have performed to verify the quantum state 
he has assigned to his friend’s lab and its contents in the scenario of A.1. 
 So consider three experimenters Alice, Bob and Charlie, each confined to a physically 
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isolated laboratory to perform one measurement of spin component on a single spin ½ atom. 
Assume that these three atoms are assigned the GHZ state for which the Born rule correctly 
predicts probabilities satisfying conditions (1)–(3) specified in A.2. Note that those conditions 
concerned simultaneous measurements. In the combined scenario it will be important to be 
explicit about what that means, since the scenario will be set in a relativistic spacetime that is 
assumed to have the structure of Minkowski spacetime, at least in the region where it unfolds. 
The laboratories of Alice, Bob and Charlie are all stationary in inertial frame Σ in which they 
perform their measurements simultaneously. 
 The universal applicability of quantum theory here implies that the Born rule may be 
correctly applied to a set of (mutually compatible) measurements that are simultaneous in any 
inertial frame. Eugene, Johnny and Daniel remain stationary in frame Σ. Eugene measures XA 
on Alice’s laboratory, Johnny measures XB on Bob’s laboratory, and Daniel measures XC on 
Charlie’s laboratory. These three measurements also occur simultaneously in Σ. 
 Following Leegwater ([unpublished])15, the assumption that a quantum measurement 
has a unique outcome may now be stated as: 
 
  Single Outcomes: Any quantum measurement has only one single outcome. 
 
This assumption applies to each of the six specified measurements. But it will turn out that 
after all of them have been completed the only surviving records are of the outcomes of the 
measurements by Eugene, Johnny and Daniel. 
 Between t0 and t1 in Σ each of Alice, Bob and Charlie measures the z-component of 
spin of the atom in his or her laboratory and records its unique outcome inside the laboratory 
without breaking isolation by communicating this outcome outside. Eugene, Johnny and 
Daniel make their measurements between t1 and t2 in Σ. Eugene measures XA on Alice’s 
laboratory together with the spin ½ atom she has measured. Johnny (Daniel) measures XB (XC) 
on Bob’s (Charlie’s) laboratory. An X-magnitude is the analog in the argument based on this 
scenario of x-spin in the GHZ scenario. But, unlike the x-spin of an atom, it would be 
extraordinarily difficult to measure an X-magnitude: it may be thought to encode detailed 
correlations between a spin ½ atom and the atomic structure of the laboratory that contains it. 
 Assuming their labs are far enough apart in Σ there will be an inertial frame Σʹ in 
which the measurements by Bob and Charlie between t1ʹ and t2ʹ are simultaneous with 
Eugene’s but after Alice’s. The quantum state assigned at a tʹ time just prior to these 
simultaneous measurements will be an analog16 of the state in the original GHZ scenario that 
implied an instance of condition (3) of A.2. We can number the possible outcomes of 
Eugene’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s simultaneous measurements, each with +1 or −1 as before. Let 
Bob, Charlie’s and Eugene’s outcomes be numbered b, c, u respectively. Then the analog to 
condition (3) implies in this case that u.b.c = +1. 
 There is another inertial frame Σ ʺ in which it is not Bob’s but Johnny’s measurement 
that is simultaneous with those of Alice and Charlie. Numbering Johnny’s outcome v the 
analog to condition (3) implies that a.v.c = +1. Finally it is Daniel’s not Charlie’s 
measurement that is simultaneous with Alice’s and Bob’s in Σ ʹʹʹ, from which we infer that 
a.b.w = +1, where w numbers Daniel’s outcome. Putting these equations together we have 
                                                 
15 Leegwater ([unpublished]) also requires the outcome to be independent of ‘perspective’, but he does not say 
what that is or how it differs from a frame. This will prove significant in section 3. 
16 As Leegwater ([unpublished]) notes, the relativistic transformation from Σ to Σʹ here also requires a unitary 
















But Eugene, Johnny and Daniel each measured an X-magnitude of a laboratory plus atom 
simultaneously in Σ when the quantum state of the laboratories plus atoms paralleled the 
GHZ state of three atoms but with XA, XB, XC in place of the x-spins of the atoms measured by 
Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively. Just as we saw in A.2 that the product of the outcome 
numbers a, b, c for measurements of x-spin must (with probability 1) be −1 in the GHZ state, 
so here the product of the outcome numbers u, v, w for measurements of XA, XB , XC 
respectively must (with probability 1) be −1, so u.v.w. = −1.17 This is inconsistent with the 
previous three equations, as can be readily seen by multiplying them together to get u.v.w. = 
+1. 
 Note two things about the contradiction we have arrived at. Each of a, b, c, u, v, w 
numbers the single outcome of one quantum measurement actually recorded in this combined 
scenario: the scenario does not involve a sequence of repeated measurements of the same 
kind on similar systems, and nor does it involve any merely possible measurements. But 
repeated application of the Born rule in different frames assigns probability zero to every set 
of six numbers representing the outcomes of those six measurements. While a probability 
zero event may occur in an infinite event space (an infinitely thin dart may hit some point on 
a dartboard even though for each point there is zero probability of it’s hitting at that point), 
the event space here is finite. The combined scenario presents us with a paradox insofar as the 
assumption of single outcomes is incompatible with the universal applicability of unitary 
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